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COMMENTS
Perfection of Public Sales
Provisions of the Civil Code
The Civil Code of Louisiana, following the French Civil Code,
provides that a sale is perfected, that is, that the purchaser
becomes the owner, when there is concurrence as to thing, price,
and consent.1 This basic concept of consensual completion of the
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2439 (1870) ; CODE CIvIL art. 1582. However, if the
parties to any sale, public or private, make specific stipulations as to when the
purchaser shall become the owner of the thing sold, in the absence of a contrary
public policy, their will should control. LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 11, 2471 (1870). But
a provision that the ownership in a movable does not transfer until the entire
price is paid, although possession goes to the purchaser prior to the final payment,
is ineffective in Louisiana. This arrangement, known as a conditional sale, has
been held violative of civilian principles of sale. Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117
So. 441 (1928) ; Grapico Bottling Works v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 163 La. 1057,
113 So. 454 (1927) ; Barber Asphalt Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152,
46 So. 193 (1908). But see Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 338 (1940) to
the effect that a conditional sale should be admissible under Louisiana law as it is
under French law as a valid suspensive condition.
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sale applies equally to sales of movable or immovable property, 2
subject to the qualification that a sale of immovable property
must be in writing.3 This effect, however, is confined to the
parties until, in the case of immovable property, the sale has
been recorded,4 or, if the sale is of movable property, until "ac-
tual delivery" of the object.5 Only after recordation or delivery
is the sale perfected as to "all the world." It should be noted
that, although the purchaser becomes the owner by concurrence
of thing, price, and consent, the seller's duty to deliver the thing
to the purchaser and the purchaser's obligation to pay the pur-
chase price are usually yet to be performed. However, the Code
makes it clear that the transfer of ownership does not await
the fulfillment of these obligations. 7
In connection with the perfection of the sale, it is well to
consider the remedies given the parties if the obligations auxi-
liary to the transfer of ownership are not fulfilled. If the pur-
chaser has paid the price but the thing has not been delivered,
he may demand either that the sale be cancelled or that he be
put into possession,8 and he may also claim damages when they
are due.9 On the other hand, if the purchaser refuses to pay,
the seller may sue either for dissolution of the sale, 10 with dam-
ages where due," or for specific performance of the purchaser's
obligation, i.e., payment of the price.' 2 Also, the seller is not
obligated to deliver the thing if the price has not been paid and
no term has been given for its payment.'3 However, on the basis
2. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1909, 1968, 2456 (1870) ; CODE CIVIL arts. 1138,
1583.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2440 (1870). But a verbal sale of immovable property
is good if admitted under oath provided there has been actual delivery of the prop-
erty. Id. art. 2275.
4. Id. arts. 1920, 2266.
5. Id. art. 1922.
6. Id. art. 1920.
7. "The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties, and the property
is of right acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as soon as there
exists an agreement for the object and for the price thereof, although the object
has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid." Id. art. 2456.
8. Id. art. 2485.
9. Id. art. 2486.
10. Id. art. 2561. In the case of movable property the vendor has an absolute
right to dissolution, without delay. Id. art. 2564. But if an immovable is sold,
unless there is a danger that the seller may lose both the price and the thing, the
judge may grant additional time in which the purchaser may pay. Id. arts. 2562,
2563.
11. Id. art. 2565.
12. Id. art. 2551.
13. Id. art. 2487. In sales of movables this means that the vendor may retain
physical possession of the thing sold. Id. art. 2478. In regard to immovables, un-
like the French Code (CODE CIVIL art. 1605), the Civil Code of Louisiana pro-
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of the Code, he is not privileged to dissolve the sale extra-
judicially. 4 From these provisions it can be seen that either
party is amply protected despite a transfer of ownership prior
to compliance with all the obligations of the sale.
The Code does not draw any distinction in the statement
of these rules between private sales on the one hand or public
sales on the other, whether voluntary or forced. Presumably,
therefore, the general principle of consensual perfection of the
sale as between the parties by the concurrence of thing, price,
and consent is as applicable to public sales as to private.'5 Indeed
the Civil Code contains specific provisions relating to public
sales, both voluntary and forced, that seem to be entirely con-
sistent with the basic principles applicable to sales in general.
vides that the tradition or delivery accompanies the act translative of title, and
provides that "every obstacle which the seller afterwards interposes to prevent the
taking of corporeal possession by the buyer, is considered as a trespass." LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2479 (1870). Therefore it would seem that article 2487 has little
applicability as to sales of immovables.
14. Interestingly enough, the idea of a right of resale without court action has,
without much direct codal authority, entered the Louisiana law of private sales.
See Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 92 (1929). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Hogan, 228 La.
38, 81 So.2d 761 (1955) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-
1955 Term - Sales, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 242, 244 (1955).
15. In this respect it is interesting to note that, although the French have no
articles specifically designating the time of completion of public sales, it would
appear that, through an application of the general principles heretofore discussed,
the purchaser is considered to become the owner at adjudication. 5 GLASSON,
TRAITE TIIORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'OROANISATION JUDICIAIRE, DE COMPETENCE ET DE
PROCEDURE CIVILE 161 (3d ed. 1936). "On se bornera d rappeler ici quelques prin-
cipes. Les ventes de biens de mineurs et, d'une manidre gndrale, les ventes volon-
taires faites en justice produisent en principe les mlmes effets que les ventes
amiables.
"L'adjudicataire devient propridtaire par la sentence d'adjudication."
In regard to sales under seizure, see 4 id. at 162: "L'adjudicataire devient pro-
pridtaire, d'abord par l'effet mdme de l'adjudication qui est un vuritable contrat, 4
la condition que la chose ait td saisie sur le propridtaire; ensuite par la mise en
possession, mgme si la chose a dt saisie sur un nonpropridtaire."
Translation: "One must here recall certain basic principles. Sales of the goods
of minors and, in general, other voluntary public sales, produce in principle the
same results as private sales. The adjudicatee becomes the owner by the judgment
of adjudication."
"The adjudicatee becomes the owner, immediately, by the adjudication itself
which is a veritable contract, on the condition that the thing has been seized from
the hands of the owner; or through the 'mise en possession' even if the thing has
been seized in the hands of a non-owner."
See also CUCHE, PRECIS DES VOlES D'EXECUTION 246-49 (1952).
CODE DE PROCEDURE CIViLE FRANVAIS art. 717 does imply, although it does not
specifically state, that the sale is complete at adjudication. It states "L'adjudica-
tion ne transmet a l'adjudicataire d'autres droits a la propiete que ceum appar-
tenant au saisi . . ."
Translation: "The adjudication does not transmit to the adjudicatee other
rights of ownership than those appertaining to the person in whose hands the
property was seized."
This article is probably the source of article 690 of the Louisiana Code of
Practice.
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Article 2607 states that when the auctioneer is satisfied that
the highest price has been offered, "he who has made the offer
is publicly declared to be the purchaser, and the thing sold is
adjudicated to him." This is followed by the provision in article
2608, that "this adjudication is the completion of the sale; the
purchaser becomes the owner of the article adjudged, and the
contract is, from that time, subjected to the same rules which
govern the ordinary contract of sale." The article makes it
clear that the adjudication itself makes the purchaser the owner
and that nothing additional, such as an act of sale for im-
movables, is needed.16 This transfer of ownership is perfectly
consistent with the concept of consensual perfection, for the
adjudication constitutes the concurrence of thing, price, and con-
sent which perfects the sale as between the parties.
Since article 2608 states that public sales are subject to the
rules governing private sales from the time of adjudication, and
after, it follows that the limitations provided in those rules as to
the effect of the transfer of ownership in regard to third par-
ties should apply. in this connection, article 2610 envisages the
later delivery of a written act of sale where an immovable has
been sold and article 2623 refers to the adjudication made and
recorded. More particularly, article 2265 provides that "all sales
of immovable property made by a sheriff or other officer, by
virtue of any execution or other order of court . . .shall be re-
corded in the parish where the immovable property is situated." 7
Finally, article 2266 provides that without this recordation, the
sale "shall be utterly null and void, except between the parties
thereto," and that the sale shall affect third persons "only from
the time of the recording." Under the rules of private sales
of movable property, the transfer of ownership is confined to
the parties until delivery. 8 Consequently, as in the case of pri-
vate sales, the provisions of the Code presumably confine the
16. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 690 (1870) : "The adjudication . . . has,
of itself alone, the effect of transferring to the purchaser all the rights and claims
which the party in whose hands it was seized might have had to the thing ad-
judged." (Emphasis added.)
It is quite reasonable that a public sale of immovables be complete as between
the parties without a writing, because the acceptance, in the presence of the
auctioneer, an officer of the court, and probably many witnesses, should be at
least as effective as an admission to an interrogatory under article 2275 of the
Civil Code. See Landry v. Laplos, 113 La. 697, 37 So. 606 (1904).
17. Recordation of the procs verbal evidently suffices. See Etta Construction
Co. v. Bruning, 134 La. 48, 63 So. 619 (1913).
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1922 (1870).
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effect of the adjudication to the parties, until delivery of a
movable sold or until recordation of the sale of an immovable.
Since the perfection of public sales is identical in principle
to the perfection of private sales, it follows that the remedies
in each for failure to perform should be similar, and they ap-
parently are. In public sales as in private sales, the seller has
the right to sue for specific performance, 19 or if the sale is for
cash, to refuse-to deliver until the price is paid.20 But while, as
has been indicated, the seller in a private sale must petition the
court to have the sale dissolved if the price has not been paid
and cannot sell to another until the dissolution is judicially de-
clared, the seller in a public sale is specifically empowered to
effect a dissolution without a court order if the price is not paid,
simply by having the thing readjudicated. 21 Moreover, if the
price in the second adjudication is smaller than in the first, in
some instances the seller may hold the defaulting adjudicatee
liable in damages for the difference. 22  It can be seen that
remedies in public sales are more expeditious than in private
sales because of the right to resell, but the only basic difference
is that one..type of resolution and resale requires, under the
Code, a judicial dissolution of the former sale, while the other
does not. Furthermore, either type of dissolution seems con-
sistent only with a system that permits perfection of the sale be-
fore the price is paid.28
19. No article specifically gives the vendor at public sale the right to sue for
specific performance, but the general provisions on sales have been applied.
Municipality No. Two v. Hennen, 14 La. 559 (1840) ; Berthod's Heirs v. Unruh,
9 La. 180 (1836) ; Marigny v. Nivet, 2 La. 498 (1831). No recent case has been
found litigating this point, but see in accord in dicta: In re Union Central Life
Ins. Co., 208 La. 253, 23 So.2d 63 (1945) ; Capital Building and Loan v. Northern
Insurance Co., 166 La. 179, 116 So. 843 (1928) ; Etta Construction Co. v. Bruning,
134 La. 48, 63 So. 619 (1913).
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2609 (1870).
21. Id. art. 2611; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 689 (1870). The ten-day delay
of article 2611 does not apply to sales under seizure because the Code of Practice
supersedes it. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2617 (1870) ; New Orleans Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Ruddock, 22 La. Ann. 46 (1870) ; Lafon v. Smith, 3 La. 473 (1831).
See also note 22 infra, which also concerns the applicability of article 2611.
22. The right to resell a la folle enchere applies not only to voluntary auctions
but probate sales. Stockelback v. Bradley, 159 La. 336, 105 So. 363 (1925). How-
ever, it is not available for sales under writ of flie facia8. Weil v. Schwartz, 49
La. Ann. 582, 21 So. 859 (1896). Orleans Parish is an exception. LA. R.S. 13:4403
(1950). Nor is it available to sales under writ of final judgment. Roussel v.
Hughes, 159 La. 864, 106 So. 332 (1925). It is never available when the original
owner is the second purchaser. Pennywell v. Baumann, 136 So. 100 (La. App.
1931).




To recapitulate, the Civil Code, in regard to both public and
private sales, seems to provide for:
(1) perfection as between the parties at the first moment
of concurrence as to the thing, price, and consent (which
in public sales is the moment of adjudication) ;
(2) perfection as to third persons from the time of delivery
of a movable or recordation of the sale of an immovable.
The Code also provides measures to enforce the unfulfilled obli-
gations of the parties remaining after the perfection of the sale.
The Jurisprudence
Private sales. The jurisprudence concerning private sales of
movable property seems to have followed the system of the
Code both as to the perfection of the sale between the parties
and in regard to third persons.2 4 The same can be said for the
jurisprudence on the perfection of private sales of immovable
property as to third persons, for the court has assiduously fol-
lowed article 2266 under the appellation of the public records
doctrine, or the doctrine of McDuffy v. Walker.2 5 However, in
regard to the perfection of private sales of immovables as be-
tween the parties, the court seems to have developed a rule that
may delay the perfection of the sale longer than the Code, pre-
sumably, contemplated. More specifically, the court seems to
have established an irrefutable presumption that the parties
to a transaction intend only a contract to sell if they refer to
a more formal act of sale to be passed later.2 6 It would seem,
however, that if the parties to a sale make a writing descrip-
tive of the property, stating a price, and stating that they
thereby sell the property, but also referring to a formal act of
sale to be passed later, it should be possible to find that they
intend to transfer ownership in the property through the first
act, the second being for evidentiary purposes only. Thus, if the
intent to sell is present, since the thing and price are determinate
24. Nettles v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 5th Cir., No.
15805, May 25, 1956; Tanner v. Eagle Bag Co., 145 La. 502, 82 So. 682 (1919);
Marshall v. Parish of Morehouse, 14 La. Ann. 689 (1859). But see the line of
cases nullifying the conditional sale. See note 1 supra. See also Comment, 3
LOUiSIANA LAw REViFW 629 (1941).
25. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
26. Davis v. McCain, 171 La. 1011, 132 So. 758 (1931) ; Legier v. Braughn,
123 La. 463, 49 So. 22 (1909) ; Capo v. Bagdahl, 117 La. 992, 42 So. 478 (1906).
In the Capo case no title passed under a contract which provided that it was to
certify "that I have this day sold my house . . . to Thomas Capo . . . ten percent
paid cash, balance when act of sale is passed." (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. XVII
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and the act is in writing, there should be no bar to a transfer
of ownership as between the parties. But the result of the juris-
prudence is that the sale would become perfect only with the
delivery of the final act of sale, and its subsequent recordation
would render it effective as to third persons.
Public sales. When the question of payment of the purchase
price has not been at issue, the court has found little difficulty
in holding public sales complete at adjudication,2 7 and this ef-
fect has properly been confined to the parties until recordation
in sales of immovable property.28  When payment of the price
has been at issue, however, the resolution of problems concern-
ing the time of completion of public sales has not been so satis-
factory.
It should first be noted that for many years there was a
definite conflict of jurisprudential authority as to the time of
completion of public sales. One line of cases has held that the
sale is complete at adjudication even if the price has not then
been paid ;29 while another has held that the sale cannot be con-
sidered as perfected until the purchase price is paid, if the sale
is for cash ;30 or, if the sale is for credit, until the delivery of
the required evidence of the indebtedness. 3 1 The position that
the adjudication completes the sale only as between the parties
27. Frank v. Magee, 50 La. Ann. 1066, 23 So. 939 (1898) ; Colligan v. Benoit,
13 La. App. 612, 128 So. 688 (1930). See also Goodrich v. Copley, 6 Rob. 107
(La. 1843); Etta Construction Co. v. Bruning, 134 La. 48, 62, 63 So. 619, 622
(1913) : "The adjudication, in the sense of the law, is the last proceeding which
concerns the purchaser; it fixes his condition under it, and is the basis of his title."
28. Doriocourt v. Lacroix, 29 La. Ann. 286 (1877). The court apparently
assumed that a public sale of immovable property was invalid as to third persons
until the act of sale was recorded.
29. Cole v. Richmond, 156 La. 262, 100 So. 419 (1924) ; Jouet v. Mortimer,
29 La. Ann. 206 (1877) ; Doll v. Kathman, 23 La. Ann. 486 (1871) (but there is
dicta in this case to the contrary) ; Brown v. Union Bank, 11 La. Ann. 543
(1856) ; Succession of Boudousquie, 9 Rob. 405 (La. 1845); Commissioner of
the Bank of Orleans v. Hodge, 8 Rob. 450 (La. 1844) ; Perkins v. Dickson, I Rob.
413 (La. 1842).
30. In re Union Central Life Insurance Co., 208 La. 253, 23 So.2d 63 (1945)
Capital Building and Loan Ass'n v. Northern Insurance Co., 166 La. 179, 116
So. 843 (1928) ; First National Bank v. Coreil, 145 So. 393 (La. App. 1933).
31. Only two cases have been found deciding the time at which public sales for
credit are complete: Mazoue v. Caze, 18 La. Ann. 31 (1866) and Perkins v. Dick-
son, 1 Rob. 413 (La. 1842). The earlier case held that under article 2591 (article
2613 of the Civil Code of 1870) the adjudicatee must be considered the owner,
although he has not paid cash or presented endorsed notes as the terms of sale
required, until he is put in default by being required to name his endorser. How-
ever, the 1866 case held that if a condition of the sale is that notes be furnished,
the purchaser is not the owner until the condition is complied with. Since the rea-
soning of the 1866 case has been cited several times as authority for holding pub-
lic sales for cash incomplete until the price is paid, it is likely that in future pub-
lic sales for credit its reasoning will also be applied.
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(recordation or delivery marking the completion as to third per-
sons) seems hardly to have been considered under either line
of cases.82
Almost immediately after the promulgation of the present
articles on public sales in the Civil Code of 1825, there appeared
dicta to the effect that the adjudication made the purchaser the
owner even if he had not paid the purchase price,83 and as early
as 1842 a case squarely so held. 4 A number of cases followed,
at rather great intervals, holding the sale perfect at adjudica-
tion, and, although many of them concern only completion as
between the parties, the distinction between this and completion
as to third persons was not made.8 5 However, since 192436 the
idea that a sale can be complete at adjudication before the price
has been paid has been consistently rejected by the courts.37
The position that the sale cannot be complete until the price
is paid, as has been indicated, is generally accepted by the court
today.8 8 Cases upholding this position, moreover, are found at
an earlier date than those upholding the contrary view, 9 and
have been more numerous throughout Louisiana's judicial his-
tory. Under these cases, the adjudication alone neither com-
32. But see Erath v. Dorville, Manning Unreported Cases 365 (La. 1880).
33. Marigny v. Nivet, 2 La. 498 (1831) ; Canal Bank v. Copeland, 6 La. 543
(1834) ; Berthod's Heirs v. Unruh, 9 La. 180 (1836).
34. Perkins v. Dickson, 1 Rob. 413 (La. 1842). See note 31 supra. See also
Succession of Boudousquie, 9 Rob. 405 (La. 1845). The adjudicatee at a probate
sale was adjudged bankrupt before he had paid the purchase price. It was held that
he acquired ownership in the property before his bankruptcy and that it therefore
had to be included in the bankruptcy settlement. The court said: "The bidder to
whom the property is adjudicated, becomes eo instanti the owner of it [2608], C.P.
690, 695 . . . the property vests in the bidder by the adjudication. It is clear that
it is not then in abeyance, and that it must remain vested in him, until it be legally
divested. The mere neglect of a compliance with conditions of the sale, does )ot
revest property in the vendor."
35. See note 29 supra.
36. Cole v. Richmond, 156 La. 262, 100 So. 419 (1924). In this case the
adjudicatee did not pay the purchase price, although the public record showed that
it had been paid. The adjudicatee sold portions of the property to third persons.
Later the adjudicatee admitted that she had not paid the purchase price. The third
parties were held to have acquired good title on the theory that the adjudicatee was
owner until divested of title and being the owner could convey title. No mention
was made of the public record doctrine.
37. See note 30 supra.
38. See note 30 supra. Since most of the cases had been in regard to cash
sales, continual reference will not be made in the text to the application of the
theory to credit sales.
39. See Mercier v. Sterlin, 5 La. 472 (1833). An executor attempted to ratify
a sale made by the noncomplying adjudicatee to a third party. The court held that
there was no sale to ratify. "[The adjudicatee] had died without complying with
his contract, and could not have claimed the property. Not being the owner of the
property, it is not seen how he could transfer that property to a third person."
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pletes the sale as between the parties nor as to third persons.
To the contrary, it has been held to create a relationship between
seller and adjudicatee similar to a contract to sell, giving either
party the right to demand specific performance, but not trans-
ferring the property. 40 It gives rise to a defeasible right that
becomes ownership when the price is paid.41
The question naturally arises as to why, despite article 2608,
the courts have held that the purchaser can in no respect be-
come the owner until the purchase price is paid. As early as
1833 the court unequivocally applied this theory, but without
any citation of authority and with little explanation.42 Subse-
quent decisions have formulated two major rationalizations for
similar holdings.
One rationalization offered by the court is that the right to
resell precludes a prior transfer of ownership.4 The court has
stated that if title passed to the adjudicatee at the time of adjudi-
cation and the right to resell was subsequently exercised, the
sale would have to be, theoretically at least, from the first
adjudicatee to the second. The court reasoned that this would
mean that the second adjudicatee of necessity would acquire
the property subject to any encumbrances that might have at-
tached to it while it belonged to the original adjudicatee. Such
a result, it has been argued, would be clearly undesirable and
should not be permitted. To prevent this, the court has inter-
preted article 2608 to mean that the sale is complete at adjudica-
tion, if the price is paid.
The problem that confronted the court could have been more
easily resolved through an application of the analysis of the
perfection of sales previously presented, that is, by differenti-
ating between perfection confined to the parties and perfection
as to third persons. The resale under this analysis presents no
serious problems. In sales of immovables prior to the recorda-
tion of an act of sale, the creditors of the adjudicatee, being
third persons to the sale, can acquire no right under it; and
40. Capital Building and Loan Ass'n v. Northern Insurance Co., 166 La. 179,
116 So. 843 (1928).
41. Ibid.
42. See note 39 supra.
43. Washburn v. Green, 13 La. Ann. 332 (1858) contains this argument. How-
ever, all that it was necessary for the court to decide was whether or not the vendor
could resell for nonpayment twelve years after the sale. Just what this case held
seems open to some doubt, but it has become one of the leading authorities for
considering the adjudication as completing no more than a contract to sell.
1956]
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after recordation, if the act stated that the price had been paid,
it would be conclusive proof of its content 44 and no resale would
be possible. If the act showed that the price had not been paid,
the creditors of the adjudicatee would be forewarned, and if the
property were resold, their rights would fall with the rights of
their debtor, the adjudicatee, just as in a resolutory action in a
private sale.45  Thus it can be seen that the right to resell
presents no obstacle to perfection of sale of immovables between
the parties, that is to say, a transfer of ownership, prior to pay-
ment of the purchase price. As to movable property, under this
analysis, there is no possibility of the adjudicatee's creditors
encumbering the property prior to delivery because the sale is
not complete as to third parties. After delivery it would seem
the rights of the adjudicatee's creditors would have to fall with
the rights of the adjudicatee. 46 As to movable or immovable
property, then, the right to resell appears to be only a right to
resolution, and does not make payment of the purchase price
the critical factor in perfection of the sale.
A second reason that has been given for holding a public sale
incomplete until the price is paid is that until payment, if the
sale is for cash, the adjudicatee has no right to possession. 47
The premise is soundly based on article 2609 of the Civil Code
in the chapter on public sales, which states: "If the adjudication
be made on condition that the price shall be paid in cash, the
auctioneer may require the price immediately, before delivering
44. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2234, 2236, 2238 (1870) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
690 (1870).
45. Cappel v. Meeker Sugar Refining Co., 169 La. 1170, 126 So. 695 (1930);
Succession of Phillips, 49 La. Ann. 1019, 22 So. 202 (1897). See Stevenson V.
Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461 (1880).
46. See Mazoue v. Caze, 18 La. Ann. 31 (1866). But the property could not
be reached if sold by the creditor since he would have possession and title (and
no problem of public records is involved). Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 89 So.2d
369 (La. 1956).
47. Mazoue v. Caze, 18 La. Ann. 31 (1866) and Lapene v. Badeaux, 36 La.
Ann. 195 (1844) are the leading cases of this rationale. In the Mazoue case the
adjudicatee had not yet paid for several cows when he surreptitiously removed
them from his vendor's farm and sold them to a third party. The case was decided
on the basis that "the sale was not complete . .. and the defendant having no
ownership in the cows, could transfer none to his co-defendant." In the Lapene
case the adjudicatee of a probate sale neither paid the price nor gained possession
of the adjudicated land for eight years. When he finally did pay he demanded not
only possession but the fruits of the land from the time of adjudication. The court
held for the vendor. "[I]t is the contract which is perfected by the agreement of
competent parties to the thing and price; but ... title to the property is really
transferred from vendor to vendee only when the terms of sale have been complied
with. It is only when the buyer can demand delivery that he is full owner and
the purchaser has no right to demand delivery until he has paid the price."
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possession of thing sold."' 48 But the conclusion that, without pos-
session, the sale is not complete seems only applicable to the
effect of a sale of movable property in regard to third persons.
However, the statement that without payment of the purchase
price the sale is not perfected does not seem accurate even in
this limited application, because it is delivery, not the right to
delivery, that perfects the sale of movable property as to third
persons.49 If the price is not paid, but the seller nonetheless de-
livers, the sale should be considered perfected as to all the world,
at least until something is done to dissolve it.
The argument that the purchaser cannot be owner without a
right to possession would seem to have its least validity when
applied to the perfection between the parties of the sale of prop-
erty, whether movable or immovable. As has been indicated,
the general provisions as to the perfection of sales make it clear
that a sale may be perfect between the parties although the price
has not been paid and the thing has not been delivered.50 Fur-
thermore, articles 2608, 2609 itself, and 2610 of the chapter on
public sales continue the differentiation between possession and
ownership ;51 article 2608 speaks of ownership and the perfection
of the sale, while the others treat only of the reciprocal duties
of delivery, payment, and passing an act of sale.
The applicability of the reasoning to the perfection of sales
of immovable property as to third persons seems equally dubious.
The writer has been able to find no authority in the Code for
holding that a public sale of immovables can have no effect as
against third parties until the price is paid, either on the ground
of no right of possession, or on any other ground. It is not pos-
session that perfects such a sale as to third parties, but recorda-
tion of the act of sale. 52 Of course, once the act is recorded, no
argument remains as to possession. The recorded act would be
full proof that the price has been paid or that terms had been
given for the payment of the price, 5 and in either case article
2609 on the retention of possession would no longer be ap-
plicable. 54 Additionally, it is probable that the sheriff's act of
48. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2609 (1870). The article is virtually identical with
article 2487 under the general provisions on sales.
49. Id. art. 1922: ". . . This effect is strictly confined to the parties until actual
delivery of the object."
50. See page 198 supra.
51. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2608, 2609, 2610 (1870).
52. Id. arts. 2265, 2266.
53. See note 13 supra.
54. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2609 (1870).
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sale is a public act and therefore constitutes a legal surrender
of possession to the adjudicatee under article 2479. 55
The reasons for holding public sales incomplete prior to pay-
ment of the purchase price or presentation of evidence of in-
debtedness were formulated many years ago. When formulated,
they may have been applied only to the perfection of the sale in
regard to third persons, and thus, while producing inaccurate
statements of law, often may not have produced unwarranted
results. However, this theoretical inaccuracy in stating the
law has led in later cases to a disregard for the distinction be-
tween perfection as between the parties and as to third persons. 56
The court has in effect held that the sale is not complete towards
anyone until it is complete towards everyone and that this com-
pletion is contingent upon payment of the price - not adjudica-
tion, recordation, or delivery.
Applications
Third persons. In line with its theory that the sale is not
complete until the price is paid, the court has held that prior
to payment the creditors of the adjudicatee cannot seize the
property that has been adjudicated to him. 5 7 However, there is
also authority for holding that if, in a sale of an immovable
for cash, part of the price is paid and the purchaser takes pos-
session of the property, his creditors may seize it.58 The court
apparently has not decided whether the creditors of the adjudi-
catee can seize the property after he has paid the price but
before the sheriff's act of sale has been recorded. It has also
been the consistent position of the court that third persons,
acquiring property through an adjudicatee before he has paid
the purchase price, acquire only a defeasible title that is lost
if the terms of the adjudication are not complied with.59 It is
submitted that the disposition of these cases has been proper,
because the rights to be determined were those of third per-
55. Id. art. 2479: "The law considers the tradition or delivery of immovables,
as always accompanying the public act which transfers the property."
56. See, e.g., Capital Building and Loan Ass'n v. Northern Insurance Co., 166
La. 179, 116 So. 843 (1928).
57. In re Union Central Life Insurance Co., 208 La. 253, 23 So.2d 63 (1945)
Lossee v. Sauton, 24 La. Ann. 370 (1872) ; First National Bank v. Coreil, 145
So. 393 (La. App. 1933).
58. Commissioners of the Bank of Orleans v. Hodge, 8 Rob. 450 (La. 1844).
See also Haynes v. Breaux, 16 La. Ann. 142 (1861).
59. In re Union Central Life Insurance Co., 208 La. 253, 23 So.2d 64 (1945)
Lossee v. Sauton, 24 La. Ann. 370 (1872).
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sons, and the sale should not be held to be perfected as to third
persons prior to delivery of a movable or recordation of the
sale of an immovable. In none of the cases had there been such
delivery or recordation.
Between the parties. Since it has been held that the adjudi-
catee does not become the owner until he has performed his
obligation to pay, the court has held that he has no right to
the revenues of the property that accrued prior to his payment
of the price.60 It would appear that the adjudicatee at a credit
sale, in a like manner, would have no right to the revenues that
accrued before he presented proper evidence of indebtedness, but
there are no cases in point. On the other hand, it has been
held, in cases in which the price was not at issue, that the
adjudicatee becomes the owner of the natural fruits of the prop-
erty that accrued not only from the time of adjudication but
from the time of seizure. 61 These cases, however, seem to turn
upon what the purchaser has bought,62 and not the revenues
from the thing after he has bought it, and are thus not in con-
flict with the previously discussed cases.
In two cases decided in 1913 and 1935 the court modified its
position as to completion, holding that once the price is paid,
the sale is considered as having been complete from the time of
adjudication.63 This retrospective notion was used to hold the
adjudicatee responsible for a paving expense in one case and a
tort liability in another, when the cause of action arose after
the adjudication but before the adjudicatee had paid the pur-
chase price. It should be noted that if this same reasoning were
applied to the right to the revenues of the property, once the
adjudicatee complies with his obligation to pay or presents se-
curities, he should become entitled to the revenues that accrued
from the time of adjudication. The Louisiana court has not had
to determine the effect of these "retrospective" cases on the pre-
60. Lapene v. Badeaux, 36 La. Ann. 195 (1844); International Shoe Co. v.
Picard, 30 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. La. 1939), affirmed, 116 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1940).
61. Frank v. Magee, 50 La. Ann. 1066, 23 So. 939 (1898) ; Colligan v. Benoit,
13 La. App. 612, 128 So. 688 (1930).
62. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 466 (1870) : "The fruits of an immovable, gathered or
produced while it is under seizure, are considered as making part thereof, and
inure to the benefit of the person making the seizure."
63. Etta Construction Co. v. Bruning, 134 La. 48, 63 So. 619 (1913) (the
adjudicatee was held chargeable for paving done after the adjudication but before
payment of the purchase price) ; Heath v. Suburban Loan Co., 163, So. 546 (La.
App. 1935) (adjudicatee held liable for injury to lessee when such injury occurred
after adjudication but prior to payment).
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vious jurisprudence, but in 1939 a federal case reiterated the
proposition that the sale is not complete until the price is paid
and that the adjudicatee has no right to revenues that accrued
before he paid.64
When, after the thing is adjudicated, a cause of action arises,
and the pricl is never paid, the court has held that the adjudi-
catee has never become the owner.06 Thus, in a case decided in
192866 a fire insurance company claimed that it was not liable
for the destruction of the insured property because the insured,
a mortgage company, had not notified it of a change of owner-
ship as was required in the policy. The house and lot in question
had been adjudicated under a writ of fieri facias but burned
before the adjudicatee paid the purchase price. After the fire
the adjudicatee refused to pay. The court held that no notifica-
tion to the company had been necessary, for there had been no
transfer of ownership.
In reference to completion as between the parties, it is sub-
mitted that giving a retrospective effect to the payment of the
purchase price is undesirable in that it allows the adjudicatee
to avoid the liabilities of ownership by refusing to pay the pur-
chase price. Also, under the Civil Code the adjudicatee ap-
parently becomes the owner, as to the seller, at the time of
adjudication and must remain the owner until something is done
to divest him of ownership. 7 Thus, unless he brings an action
to rescind the sale, the purchaser should have a right to the
revenues of the property and should be responsible for the prop-
erty as owner, whether it is advantageous to him or not, until
the seller in some way dissolves the sale.
It is further submitted, that if a contract refers to a change
of ownership, since the adjudication should make the purchaser
the owner as to the seller, the change of ownership should be
deemed to occur as of the time of adjudication.68
64. International Shoe Co. v. Picard, 30 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. La. 1939), af-
firmed, 116 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1940).
65. In re Union Central Life Insurance Co., 208 La. 253, 23 So.2d 63 (1945)
Lossee v. Sauton, 24 La. Ann. 370 (1872).
66. Capital Building and Loan Ass'n v. Northern Insurance Co., 166 La. 179,
116 So. 843 (1928).
67. See page 201 supra.




The effect given to conformance with the obligation to pay in
public sales under the Louisiana jurisprudence is, perhaps,
unique. The French, with the same basic system of sales, have
apparently reached a different result.0 9 The common law, at
least at the present, seems to be more in accord with the French
solution than the Louisiana solution.70 However, there would
appear to be no innate injustice or violation of public policy in
a consistent and carefully worked out system that would not
permit of a transfer of ownership before all the obligations of
the purchaser have been met. However, the Louisiana juris-
prudence does not provide this consistent system. Perhaps the
most undesirable feature of the jurisprudence is not its own in-
consistency, but the logical difficulty involved in interpreting
the Civil Code to mean that the purchaser in no respect becomes
owner at adjudication unless he has paid the purchase price,
despite the provisions of articles 2456, 2608, and others which
seem clearly to make the purchaser the owner at the time of
adjudication, at least as between the parties.
Harry R. Sachse
The Trial Court's Duty To Instruct On
Responsive Verdicts
If it be conceded that on a criminal trial, the judge, in in-
structing the jury as to what verdicts it may find, is limited to
verdicts of the crime charged in the indictment and of such lesser
69. See note 15 supra.
70. 2 WILLISTON, SALES 201-02 (1948), and authority cited therein. "Not only
is the contract complete when the hammer falls, but the property in the goods
passes then, unless some term of the bargain makes it impossible that it should
do so. It is of course possible that such conditions may be imposed by the terms
of the sale as to make immediate transfer of the property in the goods impossible.
The condition that the sale is for cash is, however, not such a condition as will
prevent immediate transfer of the property, since this condition may be satisfied
by construing it as meaning that possession shall not be delivered until payment.
Such a condition is indeed implied in every sale by auction, as well as in other
sales, unless there is agreement for credit.
"Though the contract is complete and the property has passed to the buyer, if
the transaction is within the Statute of Frauds it is unenforceable until a memor-
andum has been signed by the auctioneer or his clerk who are the agents of both
parties for this purpose. Until then either party still may prevent the bargain
from becoming enforceable by withdrawing from it, and the owner of the property
may revoke the auctioneer's authority prior to that time."
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